Foreword
by KNU President Saw Bo Mya
It has been almost fifty years of civil war which began since Burma
gained her independence in 1948. This civil war has continued through
this long period because of two enormous basic political problems
concerning: ethnicity / the different ethnic peoples, and democracy
/ the democratic principles for the entire population of the country,
that have failed to be resolved by peaceful, political means.
From the time it was organized in 1947, the KNU (Karen National
Union) has never desired to solve problems through the military
method. During the demonstration of more than 400,000 Karen people
on February 11, 1948, the Karens emphatically expressed their strong
emotion against internecine strife by proclaiming loudly the slogan
"(we) Don't Want Civil War". Simultaneously declared was
the desirability to seek fair, just and peaceful solution to political
problems. However, when the KNU and the Karen people were provoked
and attacked by force, in order to defend themselves, and with whatever
available weaponry, they had to resort to (taking part in) the unavoidable
revolutionary war.
In any event, endeavors have been made throughout this time to solve
the country's political problems through nonviolent, political means.
After the SLORC military took power in 1988, the combined efforts
of KNU together with other ethnic groups and powerful democratic
forces to resolve political problems by civil and peaceful means
have been in vain.
By December 1995, the beginning of conferences between the KNU and
SLORC was made possible through the striving/toiling of those committed
to peaceable process. Unfortunately, when the fourth meeting ended,
the then prevailing mutual cease-fire agreement was unilaterally
broken off by SLORC which, on the first week of February, 1997,
started an intensive military operation, thereby resuming hostilities,
and effectively discontinued and destroyed the peace negotiations.
While conducting violent and ruthless military operations against
the KNU and Karen villages, SLORC maliciously implied that the KNU
was responsible for the breakdown of talks, and it was the KNU that
made unreasonable demands during the conference. From their vantage
point, propaganda is carried on through their radio and television
stations, making calumnious statements, and creating suspicion and
misunderstanding against the KNU.
It is hoped that through this clarification document, keeping in
forefront the just and best interests of the Karens and all the
ethnic nationalities, the actual, truthful proceedings during these
negotiations that the KNU had participated with much liberal attitude,
would be, to some extent, made known to all the people of the country.
It is also hoped that the Karens and all the different ethnic peoples
in the country are able to differentiate between right and wrong,
and can faithfully hold on to truth and justice.
General Saw Bo Mya
President
The Karen Nations Union (KNU)
Chapter 1
Historical Background
On February 5, 1947, in order to unite and spearhead their movement
for freedom, the Karen people began to organize the Karen National
Union (KNU). From that time till now, the KNU has always firmly
held on to the principle of solving political problems by fair,
lawful and civil dialogue within political context. They have continually
strived for the materialization of this principle.
It was in 1947, with the AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People's freedom League)
civilian government, then in 1960, with the Bo Ne Win's Caretaker
government, and in 1963, with Bo Ne Win's Revolutionary Council,
a total of three occasions, that the KNU met and conferred with
the consecutive people in power. During those meetings, the KNU
tried to establish mutual cease-fire agreements and directed its
efforts to free, peaceful and just solutions for political problems.
However, those successive powers, instead of free, fair and lawful
political solutions to the political problems, have demanded only
complete surrender and total submission, thus the peace negotiation
attempts have ended in failure on several occasions.
After SLORC acquired power in 1988, in order to resolve the very
complicated basic political problems of the country by political
means of dialogue and negotiation, the KNU wrote and entreated the
SLORC President as shown in the following.
KAREN NATIONAL UNION
THE SUPREME HEADQUATERS
To:
Senior General Than Shwe
Chairman
State Law & Order Restoration Council
Dear General:
We see that it is imminently necessary to establish genuine and
durable internal peace in the entire country of Burma. We also need
to strive for a suitable and appropriate step by step approach,
in order to secure that peace,
In this ascending step by step approach to obtain genuine peace,
the first desirable stage is where mutual trust and close relationship
can be established with preliminary representatives of both sides
meeting face to face and planting the good seed of frank and open
discussions.
To obtain mutual relationship and trust, both sides should respect
each other's dignity and arrange for security in order to cultivate
initial open and frank discussions. The KNU is thus ready to begin
this incipient good seeding through direct conference at a mutually
agreeable external (foreign) locality where the prelimi-nary representatives
could meet. For this purpose, we are sending this letter with Rev.
Enos, through whom communications should be made, to formally find
out the Senior General's opinion.
General Saw Bo Mya
President
KNU - Karen National Union
Manerplaw June 7, 1994
Although we, on our side, have earnestly made our written communication,
the SLORC has never made any formal reply.
During 1994, there has been attempts made through the military attache,
Colonel Thein Hswe, at the Burmese embassy in Bangkok, Thailand,
and also through Anglican Bishop Andrew Mya Han, to hold peace negotiations
between the KNU and SLORC.
In those attempts to hold direct meetings, during which to benefit
from frank and just discussions, the following basic considerations
have been suggested:
1: That the negotiations should not be made separately with each
group or party alone; instead, to definitively represent all the
opposition parties as a whole in the discussions for solutions,
they should be made between the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB)
and SLORC.
2: That the locale (place) for the negotiations should be a foreign
country acceptable to both sides.
3: That this meeting for peace negotiations be conducted under the
supervision of the United Nations.
4: That this meeting for peace negotiations be accessible to people
of the news media, and news conferences can be openly held with
them.
The above suggestions by the KNU and her allied opposition groups
have been rejected by SLORC. After that, in order to begin negotiations
from any of the lowest categories, the KNU urged the SLORC President
as in the following letter.
{Repeat of identical June 7, 1994 letter, shown in the above.}
Instead of a legitimate answer to the above letter, in January of
1995, SLORC began an intensive military operation against the KNU
and took over the KNU Headquarters of Manerplaw.
The KNU represents the Karen people and while sincerely attempting,
with full commitment, to solve their problems, and also problems
relating to the unity of the indigenous people, preservation of
the Union, and achieving genuine and definitive peace, through nonviolent,
political process, such puissant and pugnacious operation against
the KNU Headquarters simply indicated that the SLORC's verbal expressions
and declarations differ completely from their practical and ruthless
actions.
By March of 1995, the KNU convened an emergency Central Committee
meeting during which it was decided that to accomplish bi-lateral
negotiations, instead of holding on to the preconditions and terms
that were suggested earlier, a more practical approach of initial
direct contact be made by the two sides to thrash out and settle
on a necessary and suitable agenda for the peace conference.
The above decision of the emergency Central Committee meeting was
confirmed by the 11th Congress of the KNU held in July 1995. During
that congress, decision was also made on the fundamental points
or policies to be adopted for the negotiations.
Chapter
2
Preparation for the Peace Negotiation Conference
In December of 1995, after the group comprising peace intermediaries:
1. U Khun Myat
2. Ex-Professor Saw Tun Aung Chain
3. Thra Hanson Tah Daw
4. P'Doh Saw Richard
5. Saw A. Soe Myint
5. Saya Mar Gay Gyi,
have arrived again with their mediatory efforts, the following preliminary
KNU delegation to prepare for the meeting and discussion was sent
on December 13, 1997. Its representatives were:
1. P'doh KaLiSay (Silver Wind) - delegation leader
2. Mahn S'ti-La - member
3. Saw Nay Soe - member
4. Saw Victor - office staff in-charge
5. Saw Dee Tu - office member
6. Mahn Chit Win - ,, ,, ,,
7. Saw Min Htoo - ,, ,, ,, .
This preliminary delegation was sent on December 13, 1995, and began
their talks at Moulmein on December 18, 1995. The delegation and
SLORC's representatives met and discussed the following terms.
for negotiations;
1. For this KNU and SLORC negotiation, the rank and number of responsible
representatives should be discussed and agreed upon. (Members of
the delegation of each side should comprise First Line Leaders and
the KNU should be represented by 7 members, plus 4 office staff
members to record minutes, a total of 11 members to attend the negotiations).
2. To settle on the time and place for the delegations to meet (To
discuss for agreement that the negotiations should take place no
later than the first week of January, 1996, and that a suitable
place in Rangoon be chosen, and only if that is not possible, then
Pa-an be considered as the venue.)
3. To discuss for the arrangement of broadcasting over the radio
and announcement in newspapers about commencing negotiations by
the two delegations one day ahead of time (on the eve of the meeting).
4. To discuss and settle on allowing the attendance by the peace
intermediaries during the negotiating sessions.
5. To settle on the freedom of recording of all of the negotiating
sessions from beginning to end by video camera, movie, still camera
and audio tape.
6. To discuss and settle on the KNU holding a press conference at
the end of the negotiations at a suitable place in the city where
the negotiations are held. (This can be omitted if SLORC objects
to it. However, each side, on its own, should always hold the right
to dispense information to the news media.)
7. To discuss and settle on the access to telephone/telegraph/radio
communication between the KNU delegation and the KNU Central Headquarters.
8. To discuss and agree on the security arrangements for the KNU
delegation by SLORC.
9. To discuss and settle on the absence of internal or external
threat or threatening gestures and actions during the negotiating
sessions.
10. To discuss and agree on the right of the KNU representatives
to meet freely with relevant people and to be able to attend religious
/ worship services of each own faith at will without any restriction
during the negotiation period.
The right to meet with relevant people means:
(1) Leaders of Karen people organizations
(2) Educated elites and Persons trusted and revered by the Karens.
(3) Buddhist Monks / Abbots and Christian Clergy Leaders.
(4) Relatives and Close Friends
(5) Members of Ethnic Political Parties and Political Leaders supported
by the people or mass.
11. At the end of the negotiations, to make known to the country
through radio and TV broadcasting, and also through newspapers and
periodicals all the minutes taken during the entire sessions.
The Negotiations
Of the 11 terms for negotiation submitted by the preliminary KNU
delegation, 2, 3, 6 and 10 were rejected by SLORC. In fact, the
very first term where First Lines Leaders should be represented
by both sides was not honored. Even though the KNU was represented
by top or First Line leaders, first or highest power level SLORC
leaders did not attend the meeting, and thus rendering this a rather
unofficial and empty gesture.
Among the 11 terms that the KNU submitted, the one that was inexorably
repudiated was #10. SLORC was adamant and unyielding against letting
the KNU representatives meet with Karen elders and educated elites,
and other national political leaders, including Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi.
The results of negotiations obtained by the initial delegation are
far from adequate for the KNU. From another perspective, SLORC has
rejected a situation for free and fair negotiations, the hope, aspiration
and trust of ethnic minorities, and a good and desirable beginning
of what are needed to establish genuine peace in the country.
However, instead of continuing the mediation for the terms that
have been rejected by SLORC, the KNU decided to make preparations
so as to commence firm negotiations by both sides, focussing on
the separate and appropriate terms that it could be independently
discussed.
Note: This meeting between the KNU preliminary delegation and SLORC
is recognized by both sides as the First Negotiation, and later
negotiation sessions are documented as Second, Third, etc.
Chapter
3
Second Negotiation
The Second Negotiation took place on February 15 - 16, 1996, at
the Southeast Command Headquarters in Moulmein. The following people
attended that meeting.
KNU Delegation
(1) Mahn Shar Lahpan Leader
(2) P'Doh Aung San Deputy Leader
(3) P'Doh Ta-Eh Member
(4) Saw Roger ,,
(5) Saw Nay Soe ,,
(6) Mahn Aung Tin Myint ,,
(7) Saw Dee Tu Office Staff In-charge (minutes)
(8) Saw Tannay Office Staff member ,,
SLORC Delegation
(1) Colonel Kyaw Thein
(2) Colonel Thein Hswe
(3) Brigadier General Aung Thein
(4) Lt. Colonel Maung Toe
(5) Lt. Colonel Myo Myint
(6) Major Khin Maung Kyi
(7) Major Myo Myint
(8) Major Thet Tin Sein
Peace Intermediaries
(1) U Khun Myat
(2) U A. Soe Myint
(3) Professor Saw Tun Aung Chain
(4) Saya Hanson Tah Daw
(5) P'Doh Saw Richard
At this Second Negotiation, the KNU submitted and discussed the
cease-fire arrangement to be observed during the negotiating sessions.
The complete text of this is as follows:
Memo on the KNU Viewpoint concerning Cease-fire for the During the
Negotiation Sessions
It is necessary to observe cease-fire during negotiations between
SLORC and KNU. The necessity derives from:
- the desirability of cultivating trust by each side during negotiation;
- the need to avoid military matters during the negotiation;
- the essentiality of conducting the talks under secure conditions;
- both sides to obtain the trust, reliance and confidence of relevant
parties, organizations, ethnic peoples, and the entire mass (people)
of Burma.
- in continuation, along with the cease-fire, the following items
are deemed necessary and proposed for mediation by the KNU; they
are:
1. The need for SLORC to let the entire country know about the cease-fire.
This need to declare the cease-fire to the whole country rests on
the following reasons:
(a) Without the declaration of cease-fire to the entire country,
(troops of) KNU allies in the basic KNU territories and the contiguous
areas, and within as well as outside the KNU regions, would continue
fighting with SLORC, and, inevitably, the KNU troops in the basic
KNU territories would be, in some way, involved in the conflict.
It is therefore highly desirable that SLORC officially announce
the cease-fire to the whole country to avoid these complications.
(b) Everyone is aware that the fighting and battles between SLORC
and KNU have been the fiercest. In view of this, to alleviate the
obduracy and antagonistic sentiment between both sides, and, concurrently,
mitigating the hardened animosity and hostile emotions between all
other armed resistant powers in the country and SLORC, it is desirable
to cultivate a good seedling in starting this negotiation by the
two sides.
(c) The countrywide declaration of cease-fire can provide encouragement
to the people of the whole country. They will have faith on this
negotiation, and support and cooperation can be forthcoming from
them. And these are extremely desirable to be attained.
(There has been a precedence when in 1963, during negotiations with
the then ruling Revolutionary Council, the Rev. Council government
made an official declaration of country-wide cease-fire.)
2. It is desirable that reinforcement for the offensive forces and
movement of heavy weapons to frontline areas be suspended.
If reinforcement for the offensive SLORC forces in the KNU territorial
grounds were not suspended during the negotiation sessions of the
two sides, there will be no doubt that the KNU as well as the Karen
people cannot put any faith in this negotiation. Thus, it is imperative
that this extremely important point should be seriously taken into
account.
3. It is necessary that construction and maintenance activities
of roads used in the military offensive operations should be suspended.
The front line roads used by SLORC offensive operations are threatening
gestures to the KNU and the Karen people living in the KNU territories.
Therefore, if construction, improvements and maintenance work on
these roads are not suspended during the talks, there would be troop
movements and confusion will undoubtedly arise between army units
on both sides as well as among the people in these areas. Thus,
to prevent these problems road construction and maintenance activities
must be suspended.
4. Recruiting new army personnel, engaging porters for the troops,
enlisting locals for watchmen or security duties, and raising corvee
should be suspended.
During the cease-fire period, rounding up new recruits for the army,
drafting porters, getting watchmen from the locals, and calling
for volunteer workers or corvee are activities directly related
to the public which can cause complications, bad feeling and confrontations,
and thus should be suspended. Only then the negotiation can earnestly
proceed without these concerns and anxieties.
5. It is necessary to suspend all the levying of money on the people
in lieu of porters, watchmen or people for security duties, corvee
or 'volunteer' workers, and demanding provisions from the people.
SLORC's various demands on the people, things that are seriously
detrimental to the people, must be absolutely stopped. Should instances
like these arise, the most appropriate actions should be taken.
If not, the negotiation between KNU and SLORC and the cease-fire
would not be beneficial to the people, and the negotiation, undoubtedly,
in some way would be harmed or impeded. Therefore these things should
cease, and in case they still happen, actions should be immediately
taken against them.
6. To refrain from forcibly relocating people; and those that have
been reestablished elsewhere by coercion, those who have to run
away and hide to avoid forced relocation, should be allowed, arrangement
and security given them, to return to live in their own villages.
Not to forcibly resettle people elsewhere, and allowing for the
return, with guarantee of full security, those who have been relocated
by force as well as those who managed to escape and hid to avoid
relocation, would be highly required and demand immediate action.
If this is not done, it would not be easy for the cease-fire and
negotiations to be successfully conducted. Additionally, permission
should be given for necessary help that can be rendered to the suffering
people by various NGO's.
7. Information and messages should be promptly available to both
sides concerning necessary personnel and troop movements.
During the cease-fire and negotiation period, prior notification
and messages on necessary troop movements on both sides should be
sent to each other. In only this way would accidental encounter
and firing on each other be avoided. Since this can create messy
and complicated situations, each side's troop positions should be
precisely demarcated.
8. During the ease-fire period, KNU must be able to freely communicate
with their own ethnic people.
Sine the negotiation between SLORC and KNU is the political destiny
for all the Karen people, during the cease-fire and negotiation
period, the KNU should be able to personally meet and discuss with,
and obtain the suggestion and counsel of the Karen people, revered
Karen Buddhist and Christian clergy members, educated elite and
respected Karen leaders. Therefore, it is desirable that these contacts
and communication should be guaranteed with freedom and security.
Only then the negotiations can be carried out honorably.
9. To mediate and solve problems that may arise during the cease-fire
period, negotiating committees represented by delegates of both
sides should be formed.
Since there could be problems between the two sides, many questionable
and difficult situations concerning the people and mass, necessitating
promptly mediated solutions, it is desirable to organize negotiating
committees within both the upper echelon leaders and lower members
of the delegations.
10. The cease-fire should be observed by an observer delegation
from the United Nations Headquarters, acceptable to both sides.
Monitoring should be available to ascertain whether or not the cease-fire
terms are strictly observed. For this, impartial and fair observer
groups, acceptable to both sides, should be maintained. Inasmuch
as the most suitable people for this are available from the UN,
both sides should request for help from the United Nations.
11. During the cease-fire period, the KNU Central Committee member
P'Doh Mahn Yin Sein and KNU members and Karen people arrested by
SLORC should be released.
In order to implement the cease-fire with positive results, it is
desirable to free the arrested and detained KNU members and other
Karens. In releasing the KNU members who were arrested in 1995,
including P'Doh Mahn Yin Sein, the Karens should be unconditionally
freed. If this were not carried out, the KNU soldiers and the Karen
people cannot look forward to any hope on this cease-fire and negotiation.
Thus, this situation must be implemented with practical results.
12. Within 30 days of mutual declaration of the cease-fire agreement
obtained during the negotiation by both sides, negotiation should
be started on fundamental problems related to internal peace for
the country.
The cease-fire being particularly for discussion and mediation of
basic problems of the country, both sides should begin serious negotiation,
aspiring for a firm and lasting peace in the country. Only then
progress (the ascension) toward genuine unity of people in the country
and an authentic federation system can be achieved.
The above 12 items of KNU viewpoints concerning the cease-fire being
closely related characteristics, as a first stage of discussion
based upon these points, it was hoped that both sides, with mutual
fairness and benefit, could conduct the negotiating process.
After the meeting and discussion of the above 12 items, the SLORC
delegation indicated their view by rejecting 5 of them - #1,3,8,10
and 12; and accepting 7, - #2,4,5,6,7,9 and 11, for mediation after
the cease-fire. However, before considering these 7 items for negotiation,
it would be necessary for the KNU to relinquish their armed resistance
course of action and return to the 'legal fold,’ a prerequisite
stipulated by them.
The SLORC, in explaining their view of "relinquishing the armed
resistance course of action and returning to the 'legal fold'"
is the same scheme used in the cease-fire arrangements made with
and accepted by all the 15 other ethnic groups; and it is clear
that this very model (or scheme) had been carried out with the KIO
(Kachin Independence Organization).
Close review and scrutiny were made on this Second Negotiation where
the KNU delegation has submitted their 12 proposals and SLORC on
their part have indicated where they stood on these points. The
KNU discussed among themselves the basic standpoints of both sides
and how the gap between them could be brought closer, and decided
on another meeting (Third Negotiation). After this the Second Negotiation
was brought to an end.
(Note: Quotation marks used for 'legal fold' should be obvious to
anyone familiar with merely the rudiments of democracy; the fact
that the SLORC government took power by military force, disregarding
poll results obtained through an unexpected and almost unbelievably
honest election (thanks to the military regime itself that had superciliously
underestimated the sentiment of the populace), and completely ignoring
the wish of the people, could not make it any more legal than the
armed resistance groups that it is trying to subjugate and annihilate).
Chapter
4
Third Negotiation
After careful scrutiny of the basic views and standpoints of the
two sides of the Second Negotiation, it can be seen that the differences
are quite enormous.
The basic standpoint of the KNU is that political problems should
be solved by seeking peaceful and diplomatic solutions through free
and fair negotiations, and the cease-fire period is required for
the purpose of such negotiation.
The basic standpoint of the SLORC is for the KNU to reject the military
or armed resistance course of action and return to the 'legal fold',
and under the banner (and sign board) of improvement and advancement
of the people and the border areas, cooperate with SLORC; and, eventually,
following the completion of drawing up the country's 'constitution,’
relinquish all arms and weapons, and as an organized political party
of the KNU, can then enter politics.
Instead of carrying out much reciprocal discussions with SLORC during
the Second Negotiation, the KNU have considered that only after
the re-examination of differing standpoints of the two sides at
their headquarters, would they conduct mutual mediation at the Third
Negotiation.
At the Third Negotiation, it was decided that the 5 items rejected
by SLORC and the new motion submitted by SLORC about the relinquishing
of armed resistance course of actions and returning to the 'legal
fold' would be reciprocally discussed again at length.
Later, a delegation of KNU representatives was sent to Moulmein
for the Third Negotiation. It comprises the following:
(1) General Tah Mla Baw Leader
(2) Mahn Shah La Pan Deputy. Leader
(3) P'Doh David Taw Member
(4) Saw Th'mane Tun ,,
(5) Mahn Aung Tin Myint ,,
(6) P'Doh Zaw Naung Office-in-charge
(7) Mahn Chit Sein Office Member
(8) Saya Gyee Gyi Medical Officer
(9) Saya Min Htoo Minutes
(10) Saya Nyi Nyi Minutes
(11) Saw Sheh Leh Military Aide
The following were SLORC representatives to the Third Negotiation:
(1) Colonel Kyaw Win
(2) Colonel Kyaw Thein
(3) Brigadier General Aung Thein
(4) Lt. Colonel Sann Pwint
(5) Lt. Colonel Myo Myint
(6) Major Myo Myint
(7) Major Khin Maung Kyi
(8) Captain Kyaw Thura
The following Peace Intermediaries attended the Third Negotiation:
(1) U Khun Myat
(2) U A. Soe Myint
(3) Professor Saw Tun Aung Chain
(3) Saya Hanson Tah Daw
(4) P'Doh Saw Richard
(5) Saya Mar Gay Gyi
The Third Negotiation was held from June 29 to July 2, 1996 at the
SE Command Headquarters in Moulmein as was held in the previous
occasion.
At that meeting, the 5 items of KNU that had been rejected by SLORC
during the Second Negotiation were resubmitted for negotiation.
Of the 5 proposals, germane to the first which was about discussions
on the declaration of country-wide cease-fire, it was pointed out
that the various resistance organizations happened to be allies;
having cease-fire with one organization while fighting with another
could create complications rendering control of the cease-fire difficult;
for example, even though cease-fire was observed with the KNU, if
fighting continued with the KNPP, or if continued battles occurred
with other resistance organizations such as ABSDF, ABMU, etc., problems
and complications could arise, and only if SLORC made a declaration
of country-wide cease-fire, then these problems would be surmounted;
- but SLORC maintained that the negotiation was only between KNU
and SLORC, thereby rejecting again this motion.
SLORC's rejection of KNU's proposal item #12 which was about starting
negotiations on fundamental problems to obtain peace in the whole
country after cease-fire was achieved and mutually declared, the
KNU delegation re-submitted clarifications, and for further mediation,
thus:
"The current civil war that has gone on for more than 40 years
has nothing to do with personal problems, neither has it been because
of personal animosity; it was basically political problems that
brought about the civil war. For that reason, it would be inevitable
to negotiate on these basic problems, and only then genuine peace,
firm and real unity of the peoples in the country could be created."
But SLORC's reply was, " SLORC is only a military government
and cannot negotiate on things concerning politics."
If this were the case, to the further query of, "When and where
will the basic political problems be considered; and whether the
political questions are being discussed and solutions sought at
the National Convention?"; SLORC's explanation was, "Political
problems will have to be solved by the future government (that would
takeover); and the current National Convention is not meant for
solving political problems, but only to set the foundation for a
basic political structure."
In addition to rejecting the above two very important proposals
by the KNU, item #3 which concerns suspending further construction
and maintenance of roads used for offensive operations; #6 that
people should not be forcibly relocated and those who were subjected
to relocation should be allowed with full security for them to return
to their own former villages and permission granted to NGOs to render
help; proposal item #10 that the cease-fire by both sides be monitored
by a UN observer delegation; - SLORC's answer was that these 3 points
were also unacceptable and could not be carried out.
Continuing, the KNU gave the following explanation on the impossibility
to accede to SLORC's proposal for the KNU to relinquish armed resistance
and return to the 'legal fold.’
To follow the military course of action is to solve problems through
the use of arms and weapons. For that very reason, repudiating the
use of arms between the SLORC and the KNU should be mutually beneficial.
If only one side is to do so (and relinquish the use of arms), it
will be unreasonable and quite ridiculous. To return to the 'legal
fold' is the euphemism employed since 1948 by those in power for
'surrendering', 'coming back into the light' and 'exchanging weapons
for democracy.’ In essence, it is identical to conceding defeat.
This returning to the 'legal fold' is similar to concession of defeat
and submission to SLORC's administration. Therefor the KNU cannot
accept the process of returning to the 'legal fold'. Particularly,
the cease-fire between SLORC and the KNU, predicated upon relinquishing
the military course of action and returning to the 'legal fold'
is an unnecessary prerequisite. This has never been a traditional
procedure (for cease-fire and peace negotiations).
The SLORC delegation further suggested that for the phrase of "relinquishing
the armed resistance course of action and returning to the 'legal
fold'" other words and phraseology could be sought, should
be looked for, or might be substituted; however, it was necessary
that the essence of "rejecting the military course of action
and returning to the 'legal fold'" must not be destroyed.
Regarding this, the KNU countered that since changing the words
and usages without altering the intrinsic properties of the phrase
would, in effect, still mean conceding defeat; coming under SLORC's
governing, there was no point in looking for new phrasing. The KNU
replied that it could not accept this position; and it was unnecessary
to set this as a condition.
Having held the negotiation sessions between the KNU and SLORC delegations
with sincerity and openness, the SLORC representatives emphasized
the following two points. They are:
(1)The SLORC delegation represented by Col. Kyaw Win and Col. Kyaw
Thein, on their part, pointed out that they had been able to accomplish
cease-fire agreements with 15 other ethnic armed resistance organizations
without failure; and that they would try hard until achieving agreement
on this current KNU cease-fire negotiation; otherwise the historical
record would look farcical.
(2) They had anticipated that the KNU would, in no way, accept the
concept of relinquishing the armed resistance course of action and
returning to the 'legal fold'. In submitting this point, it was
simply because the SLORC did not wish to be attacked on both sides
If the KNU could not accept "the relinquishing of military
course of action and return to the 'legal fold'", it was possible
to substitute any phrase of assurance; and thus the SLORC delegation
indicated that they would report to their SLORC leaders and further
discuss the rephrasing of this point.
The Third Negotiation was brought to an end after both sides decided
to look for answers to bring their positions closer at the Fourth
Negotiation.
Chapter
5
Fourth Negotiation
On almost every occasion of negotiations with SLORC, the SLORC delegation
pointed out that they represented a new generation, operating under
a new system with new concepts, always maintaining that there was
no dogmatism on their part.
After the Third Negotiation of the KNU and SLORC, and careful study
made on the proceedings of that negotiation, instead of following
strictly the agenda of the 12 items that the KNU submitted for mediation,
it was considered that a practical approach to further negotiation
would be more appropriate, with the possibility of coming closer,
and thus a new proposal was decided to be submitted at the Fourth
Negotiation
For the Fourth Negotiation, the following KNU delegation was sent
on November 20, 1996, to Moulmein. It comprised:
(1) General Tah Mla Baw Delegation Leader
(2) Mahn ShaLaPan Deputy Leader
(3) Major General Maung Maung Member
(4) Saw Nay Soe ,,
(5) Mahn Aung Tin Myint ,,
(6) Saw Aung Maw Aye Office In-charge
(7) Mahn Tha Htoo Office member
(8) Saw Kuu Thay ,,
(9) Saya Gyee Gyi Medic In-charge
(10) Saya Minn Htoo Recording (video)
(11) Saya Nyi Nyi Recording (still camera)
(12) Saw Sheh Peh Military Aide
(13) Saw Maung Ga Lay ,,
The Fourth Negotiation was held from November 21 to November 23,
1996, at the Southeast Command Headquarters in Moulmein.
Those attending the meeting were:
KNU Representatives:
(1) General Tah Mla Baw Leader
(2) Mahn ShaLaPan Dy. Leader
(3) Maj. Gen. Maung Maung Member
(4) Saw Nay Soe ,,
(5) Mahn Aung Tin Myint ,,
(6) Saw Aung Maw Aye Office In-charge
(7) Mahn Tha Htoo ,,
(8) Saw Kuu Thay ,,
SLORC Representatives:
(1) Colonel Kyaw Win Leader
(2) Colonel Kyaw Thein ,,
(3) Brig. Gen. Aung Thein ,,
(4) Lt. Col. Sann Pwint ,,
(5) Lt. Col. Hpone Hswe ,,
(6) Major Khin Maung Kyi ,,
(7) Major Thet Tin Sein ,,
(8) Major Myo Myint ,,
Peace Intermediaries:
(1) U Khun Myat
(2) U A. Soe Myint
(3) Professor Tun Aung Chain
(4) Saya Hanson Tah Daw
(5) P'Doh Saw Richard
At the meeting, the KNU submitted a new proposal concerning the
cease-fire arrangement consisting of the following 3 items. They
are:
(1) The problems between the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC) and the Karen National Union (KNU) should not be solved
by military means or armed struggle, and to maintain cease-fire;
(2) Once the cease-fire goes into effect, the SLORC and KNU should
continue negotiating on matters concerning the Union (of the country),
unity among the peoples, and the achievement of a firm and durable
peace in the country;
(3)In order to maintain the cease-fire, mediation and demarcation
to be made on the positions of the troops of the two sides, and
regulations and rulings to be followed by troops of both sides.
The 3 items of proposal was submitted by the SLORC delegation leader,
Colonel Kyaw Win, to his SLORC superiors who countered with the
following points. They were:
1. To relinquish the armed resistance course of action and enter
the 'legal fold', and make legal declaration (on these).
2. Observation of cease-fire.
3. Mediation on the demarcation of troop positions.
4. Cooperation on projects for the regional development.
5. To attend the National Convention, relating to politics.
6. When the Constitution has been drawn up (at the National Convention),
to finally reject all arms and weapons, and form a lawful/legal
political party.
When the SLORC delegation sought the impression on their 6 items
of counterproposal, the KNU responded that they would furnish their
reply on these by the end of December 1996, and the Fourth Negotiation
was brought to a close.
Chapter
6
Reply to the SLORC's 6 Items of Counterproposal
The basic course of action to be taken at the KNU and SLORC negotiation
had been drawn up and confirmed during the 11th KNU Congress held
in 1995 and the KNU Central Executive Committee was authorized to
be responsible for carrying out the various functions and duties.
Inasmuch as the 6 items of counterproposal by SLORC were in too
much disparity with the KNU's basic course of action, it was impossible
for the KNU to accept them. In any case, after discussions of these
points by the Central Executive Committee, The KNU had settled on
a reply by the end of December 1996.
On December 30th, 1996, the KNU Central Executive Committee held
a meeting and the following KNU reply, dated December 31st, 1996,
was sent to SLORC.
Letter sent by the KNU President to SLORC President on December
31, 1996
To:
Senior General Than Shwe
President
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)
Dear General:
The following reply is given for the counterproposals by SLORC at
the Fourth Negotiation between the SLORC and KNU.
1. At the Fourth Negotiation held at Moulmein from November 21 to
November 23, 1996, the SLORC presented the following 6 points of
counterproposal and wanted a reply on what the KNU thought about
these 6 points. The 6 items of SLORC's viewpoints are:
1. To relinquish the armed resistance course of action and enter
the 'legal fold', and make legal declaration;
2. Observation of cease-fire;
3. Mediation on the demarcation of troop positions;
4. Cooperation on projects for regional development;
5. To attend the National Convention, relating to politics;
6. When the Constitution has been drawn up (at the National Convention),
to finally reject all arms and weapons, and form a lawful/legal
political party.
Of these 6 points, point #1 is, in essence, the concession of inferiority,
with the same meaning of coming under SLORC's rule, and thus the
KNU cannot accept this point. The KNU is unable to recognize this
point as a precondition for cease-fire negotiations of both sides.
Concerning point #5, for reasons that: - one of the 6 political
directives set up at SLORC's National Convention stating that in
future national politics, the Army will assume the leading role
with SLORC itself promising the people to implement this, being
opposite and against democracy's fundamental principles of all the
parties; the drawing up of the Constitution to be fundamentally
based on principle #104 at that National Convention in no way whatsoever
be acceptable by all the ethnic peoples in the country; the winners
of the 1990 national election, the main party of the National League
for Democracy (NLD) being opposed and boycotted this National Convention;
the currently remaining convention representatives and the mass
of people in the entire country no longer having faith and interest
in this Convention, it is impossible for the KNU, on its part, to
attend this Convention. To abide by the results of this Convention
will be more difficult to do so.
On Item #6 where arms and weapons are to be rejected once the Constitution
has come into being, even before knowing whether or not the forthcoming
Constitution would be accepted by all the ethnic peoples and all
the citizens of the country, whether or not it would be acceptable
to the KNU organization and the Karen people, - to promise ahead
of time that arms and weapons must be rejected when the Constitution
has been obtained, is unreasonably lacking in credibility, thus
the KNU cannot accept this.
2. On the proposal of 12 items by the KNU during the Second Negotiation,
the SLORC delegation had indicated that, "the main necessary
point was for the two sides to first stop fighting. Therefore, at
the Fourth Negotiation, the KNU on its part looked for more practical
ways, thus -
(1) The problems between the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC) and the Karen National Union (KNU) should not be solved
by military means and to maintain cease-fire;
(2) Once the cease-fire goes into effect, the SLORC and KNU should
continue negotiating on matters concerning the Union, unity among
the people of the country, and the achievement of firm and durable
peace in the country;
(3) In order to maintain the cease-fire, mediation and demarcation
to be made on the positions of troops of the two sides, and the
regulations and rules to be followed by both sides;
Comprising three points that had been solemnly proposed. If agreement
could first be based on these three items and negotiations continued
on, the KNU believed that not only the wishes of the Karens but
those of all the rest of ethnic peoples and of the citizens in the
country would be represented. Therefore, the KNU requests that the
above 3 points be reconsidered again, and should they be rejected,
explanations be given for the reasons of their rejection.
3. Peace in the country, unity among the peoples, and the development
of the country depend upon the cessation of the civil war. In carrying
out the great responsibility of ending the civil war, the part where
problems can be peacefully mediated and solved after cease-fire
has been obtained between the SLORC and KNU is very important indeed.
Therefore it is the responsibility of the two sides to carry out
the present negotiation with reason and certitude. This responsibility
has to be taken.
After having gone through the longest and most fierce war, the two
sides have managed to overcome a plethora of difficulties to meet
and discuss quite frankly in these last four occasions. Be that
as it may, the KNU is deeply convinced that it is not appropriate
to return to the former stage of savage fighting but rather to continue
the negotiations. Along with this viewpoint, it is necessary that
both sides should try to hold a Fifth Negotiation, and the KNU on
its part will make an effort to that end.
In closing, may the General and SLORC leaders enjoy good health
in the New Year, and may efforts be made toward peace in the country,
would be our sincere regards and prayers.
General Saw Bo Mya
President
The Karen National Union (KNU)
December 31, 1996
Copies to:
(1) General Maung Aye - Deputy Chairman (SLORC)
(2) Lt. General Khin Nyunt - Secretary (1) (SLORC)
(3) Lt. General Tin Oo - Secretary (2) (SLORC)
(4) Peace Initiators
A month after this reply was sent, on January 31, 1997, the following
Peace Intermediaries arrived at the KNU Headquarters. They were:
(1) U Khun Myat
(2) U A. Soe Myint
(3) Professor Saw Tun Aung Chain
(4) Saya Hanson Tah Daw
(5) P'Doh Saw Richard
Accompanying the Peace Intermediaries were the following former
Karen (military and civil) officers. They comprised:
(1) Saw Barny
(2) Saw Po Ni
(3) Saw Nay Way Htoo
(4) Saya James
(5) Saya Calvin
(6) Saw True Blood
(7) Saw K'Thwee
After the arrival of Peace Intermediaries, one of them, Professor
Saw Aung Chain, disclosed what the SLORC leaders had to say. The
message from the SLORC leaders were:
(1) If the KNU does not relinquish the armed resistance course of
action and return to the 'legal fold', the Army's Intelligence,
the DDSI (the Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence), will
no longer be able to negotiate with the KNU;
(2) Although the two sides cannot resume the negotiation, communications
between the two sides will be continuously maintained as before;
(3) If the DDSI cannot resume negotiation with the KNU, it does
not know how the DS-A (Defence Services - Army)[read-Army], can
continue to carry it out.
Following the KNU's perspective and explanation, that it would abide
by and make efforts according to the viewpoint contained in the
December 31, 1996, letter of the KNU President to the SLORC President,
the Peace Intermediaries left the KNU Headquarters.
While the KNU profoundly and very seriously endeavoring to solve
the political problems through peaceful, political means of negotiations,
as stated in the above, on February 11, the SLORC initiated very
strong and concerted military offensive operations against the KNU
basic strongholds. Actually, the SLORC had already begun preparations
for war (offensive military actions) since the beginning of January
of 1997.
Chapter 7
Addendum (to the Negotiations)
1. The altruistic endeavor by the KNU to solve political problems
by political means involving peaceful negotiations
The KNU had strived hard, adhering to the principle of solving political
problems by political means of peaceful negotiations. In such endeavors
as these, both sides need to work toward trying to obtain mutual
concessions; it was taken for granted that such attempts to obtain
mutual concessions would be required to be made by both sides. Therefore,
the KNU on its part had tried its utmost to make concessions. In
having done so, the following points had been the KNU's endeavors
of making concessions, banking on much hope at the expense of lowered
dignity.
Initially, although the KNU had proposed that the negotiations be
made with combined opposition parties as a whole; that the locale
for the negotiations be one of the foreign countries acceptable
to both sides; that the peace negotiations be conducted under the
supervision of the United Nations; and that the meetings be accessible
to the news media and news conferences be openly made with them;
and yet in later stages, these proposals were not retained any more,
yielding them up in order to facilitate negotiations by the two
sides.
When the preliminary delegation was sent preparatory to negotiations,
the KNU proposed to meet and consult at liberty with the Karen people,
Karen leaders and educated elite to discuss freely matters related
to the ethnic Karen people, and even though this point was regarded
as vital, it was given up as a next step of concession at the rejection
of it by SLORC. Furthermore, the proposal to freely confer with
political parties and leaders supported by the mass in cities was
also rejected by SLORC and was given up as another KNU concession
to SLORC.
At the Fourth Negotiation, when, instead of repeatedly dwelling
on the 12 items without yielding, the KNU resubmitted a new, more
practical proposal of three items, tantamount to another concession.
To the extent that the KNU on its part trying to yield this far,
could not be regarded as small concessions. It was the desire to
aspire toward genuine peace in the country that these concessions
have been made.
The SLORC on its part had not made any concession throughout the
negotiations. Even though they themselves claimed that they were
not conceptually static and were free of dogmatism, it was merely
to make them sound nice and, in fact, they have not yielded an inch
from their original standpoint from the beginning to the end (of
the negotiations).
2. SLORC's propaganda accusing the KNU proposals as excessive demands
After the Fourth Negotiation, SLORC unilaterally ignored the KNU's
proposal for the Fifth Negotiation, and began offensive military
operations against the KNU. Simultaneously, they generated the propaganda
that the KNU made unreasonable demands, turning their back toward
peace.
In fact, close examination of the last 3 items submitted by the
KNU very obviously indicates that those were simple, clear and practical
proposals. Thus, objectively viewed, these 3 proposals include not
even an iota that symbolizes excessive demand. In reality, during
the negotiations, those making excessive demands were only the SLORC.
Not only was the proposal that the KNU reject the military course
of action and return to the "legal fold' an excessive demand
by the SLORC, but that repeated gesture was tantamount to merely
making cursory contact with the KNU. Therefore, it was the SLORC
that made insincere and excessive demands on the KNU and turned
its back toward peace.
3. SLORC's lip service toward confidence building (to establish
trust in them) and their practical actions
From the moment negotiations began between SLORC and the KNU, SLORC
had talked about 'confidence building'. However, their practical
actions were quite opposite to the idea of confidence building.
During the negotiations by the two sides, even though the KNU managed
to stop offensive attacks against the SLORC's basic and strategic
positions, apart from suspending attack on the KNU's Central Headquarters,
the SLORC continued to conduct offensive military operation to gain
the upper hand in other KNU territories, forced relocation of Karen
villages, and used several methods of torture, coerced labor, and
caused death on the Karen mass. Thus, the SLORC talked about establishing
confidence from the people while, in practice, they were actually
destroying this 'confidence building'. These atrocious military
offensives aimed at clearing away whole regions have been continued,
particularly in the districts such as Toungoo, Pyinmana, Nyaunglebin,
Thaton, Papun and Pa-an. These were very disturbing and tragic deeds
of SLORC during the negotiations, glaringly revealing that what
they said and what they really did were entirely different.
4. Examining the concept regarding "the rejection of armed
resistance course of action and returning to the 'legal fold'".
In examining the SLORC's demand of the rejection of armed resistance
course of action and returning to the 'legal fold', it can be seen
that there are 2 sections.
The first section has to do with rejecting the armed resistance
course of action. The armed resistance course of action is the settling
of problems by depending on the military, relying on weapons, through
violence. The use of arms or weapons as the main course of action
throughout the entire country happens to be the SLORC. On this point,
the demand of any pledge to reject the use of arms or weapons as
the course of action should be made by both sides. This pledge must
be observed and honored by both sides. When the KNU entered the
motion of not solving problems through military means, and declaring
truce or cease-fire, that proposal was related to this very point
which, to be accomplished, not just one side, but only when both
sides could observe and honor it - (the pledge to reject the course
of action where arms and weapons are the means of settling problems).
This concept, where only one side demands the pledge, to comply
and honor it, is untenable and defies reason.
In consideration of the section on "returning to or entering
the 'legal fold'", after the SLORC took power, the country's
Constitution had been abrogated. The SLORC itself practices military
dictatorship and rules (the country) under martial law. It can be
seen that even the SLORC itself has not followed and abide by its
own promulgated laws and legal decrees. For this reason, the saying
of SLORC about "returning to the 'legal fold'" is quite
meaningless. The actual meaning of this is simply to return under
the SLORC's martial law rule. Another way of looking at this phrase
is to signify the "return into light"(from darkness) or
simply to concede defeat. Therefore, it goes without saying that
it is unnecessary and untenable to have this phrase of "returning
to the 'legal fold'' as a prerequisite for the cease-fire of both
sides and for continuing negotiations on the basic problems of peace.
After communicating and obtaining information from the relevant
15 organizations claimed and publicized by SLORC that they had rejected
the armed resistance course of action and returned to the 'legal
fold', it has been discovered that there were much insincerity and
chicanery. For example, the KIO (Kachin Independence Organization)
had never made any kind of agreement with SLORC on rejecting the
armed resistance course of action and the returning to or entering
the 'legal fold'. Neither had the New Mon State Party (NMSP) agreed
to the idea of entering the 'legal fold'. However, in celebrating
those 'cease-fires', SLORC unilaterally declared and publicized
through signboards and photographs about celebrating "the rejection
of armed resistance course of action and returning to the 'legal
fold'". The same thing has been done to the rest of the organizations
and profiteering propaganda has been made by SLORC that 15 national
minority groups had understood and embraced its veritable sincerity,
having rejected the armed resistance course of action and returned
to the 'legal fold'. In view of the aftermath of these, it is very
disgusting and highly regrettable to see that the "relinquishing
the armed resistance course of action and returning to the 'legal
fold'" is simply a misused slogan of SLORC to profit from it.
Therefore, the KNU will be unable to comply when asked to accept
this phrase.
5. To solve political problems through political means
The civil war that began since 1948 and has continued for nearly
50 years is because political problems have not been solved by political
means.
Although the KNU has conferred on 3 different occasions with former
successive regimes in power, and has made sincere endeavors of asking
for fair and honorable political means of solving political problems,
those in power had always rejected this and continued large offensive
military actions against the KNU, thus compelling it to still carry
on defensive war today. In this recent negotiation with SLORC, during
the very moment of sincerely trying to explore for solutions to
basic problems related to the country's internal peace once a cease-fire
has been declared, the SLORC unilaterally broke off the meetings
and began offensive military actions, thereby having destroyed the
negotiations.
Of the truce (supposedly) obtained by the various ethnic armed resistant
groups, although there had been hope and expectation to meet and
solve affairs of these ethnic minorities after cease-fire has been
declared with SLORC, to this day, no such meeting of solving political
problems has been made. Not only had such meetings failed to take
place, there have been and still are several grave difficulties
to overcome, simply to maintain the fragile cease-fires. For the
Kayah National Progressive Party (KNPP), because of SLORC's military
offensive against them, they no longer could abide by the truce,
and fighting has resumed. In some areas, part of the New Mon State
Party (NMSP) troops have begun fighting again. Some organizations
in the Shan State are currently having tremendous difficulties trying
to maintain their cease-fires. The situation for SLORC is that as
long as they continue their refusal to solve political problems
through nonviolent, sincere, honorable and ethical mediation, and
persist in their repression on, and leaving no options for, the
ethnic groups, they will not, in the long run, be able to observe
and maintain cease-fire with some within the organizations that
they have currently declared truce. The explosion is inevitable
in the near future. At the present moment, stern and rigid conducts
(by SLORC) are increasing in quite a number of places.
The KNU will not be able to accept suppression and bullying by those
using arms and weapons. Sincere efforts will continue to be made
to solve political problems though reasonable, credible, honorable
and free mediation. The present situation is that, should violent
military actions be directed toward the KNU and the Karen people,
to protect themselves, they would have to take repelling, defensive
actions.
At this moment, the SLORC has unilaterally broken off negotiations
with the KNU and is conducting ruthless offensive military actions
against the KNU and the Karen people. In this offensive, the SLORC's
scorched-earth actions, including larceny, destruction and burning
of entire villages, and massacre have become the most cruel and
worst record in the annals of the Karen people's history. Nonetheless,
should SLORC sincerely get on the way of solving political problems
through political means of peaceful negotiations, and once it ceases
violent, offensive military actions against the KNU and the Karen
people, the KNU, on its part, wishes to make this clarification
and profound statement that it is willing to go on and solve problems
through negotiations that should be reasonable, fair, honorable
and equitable.
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